After an unusual August of geopolitical summitry, the reality is sinking in that Europe is on its own in defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and hence its own security against Russian aggression and cannot count on much support from the United States.
The sense of strategic loneliness in an increasingly brutal global power contest follows a summer of submission in which the EU accepted a manifestly unbalanced trade deal imposed by Donald Trump and pledged improbably large investments in the US while European Nato members promised to boost their defence spending to an aspirational 5% of gross domestic product – all to appease Trump in hopes of keeping the US engaged in European security.
To be sure, it could have been worse. By accompanying the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the White House last week, the leaders of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Finland and the European Commission displayed their unity in rejecting Vladimir Putin’s demands for territorial concessions to end the war, which Trump had come close to echoing. They managed to mitigate some of the political damage caused by Trump’s red-carpet welcome for the Russian president in Alaska and secured a vague pledge from Trump that the US would provide some support to a European-led security force for Ukraine in case of a ceasefire agreement.
However, Trump once again ruled out Nato membership for Kyiv and dropped the demand that Russia accept an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine without securing any reciprocal concession from Putin, and he let another self-declared deadline for tougher sanctions against Moscow slip by without any action. Nor did he give any assurance that Europe would have a seat in any future peace negotiations. Moreover, his Treasury secretary said the US would charge a 10% mark-up on all European purchases of American weaponry for Ukraine – in effect a war tax on its own allies.
The White House made clear any US support for a reassurance force being mustered by the UK and France for Ukraine would not involve “boots on the ground”. Trump hinted Washington might provide air power but the Pentagon’s policy chief told European military chiefs that US assistance would be very limited. It’s not clear how far the Europeans will be able to rely on crucial US intelligence sharing, let alone US backup if European forces were to come under attack in Ukraine. Washington is reported to have stopped sharing intelligence about its Ukraine-Russia negotiations even with its closest Five Eyes allies – the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand – on the orders of Trump’s intelligence coordinator, Tulsi Gabbard.
That means European governments weighing up whether to commit ground troops, air forces, anti-missile defences, naval units or trainers to support postwar Ukraine cannot be sure that the US may not suddenly blind them, withholding vital intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance if Russia were to begin another military buildup or resume hostilities.
Europe’s de facto leadership group also faces political and economic challenges at home as it struggles to boost military and financial support to Kyiv and put together a credible plan for postwar security “guarantees”.
Impressive as it was, the White House show of European unity and resolve is already fraying. The Italian deputy prime minister, Matteo Salvini, has derided President Emmanuel Macron’s call to put European forces in Ukraine. The German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, is under fire within his own coalition for suggesting that Berlin would contribute troops to the reassurance force being put together by the “coalition of the willing”.
There were also questions about the absence of Poland, a resolute supporter and neighbour of Ukraine and the strongest central European state, from the Oval Office summit, apparently due to a standoff between the pro-EU prime minister, Donald Tusk, and the new pro-Trump president, Karol Nawrocki. Warsaw has said it won’t contribute troops to a European force because it needs them to defend its own borders with Russia and Belarus. Meanwhile, awkward choices loom over Turkey’s participation in any European-led security force. Ankara, which controls access to the Black Sea, is likely to seek political concessions from the EU, including access to EU-funded rearmament projects as a trade-off for committing its forces.
This all raises the fundamental question of whether a European-led coalition of states can really provide credible security guarantees for Ukraine in the event of a ceasefire. What would be the defined mission and the rules of engagement for a reassurance force, with what US or Nato backup in case it came under Russian attack? Do the key European states with uncertain US backing have the political will and staying power to deter Putin, whose aim is precisely to push the US out of European security and divide the Europeans among themselves?
Memories of European peacekeeping failures in Bosnia in the 1990s and of the pusillanimous European response to Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea from Ukraine are not encouraging.
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The European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, has made clear most of the burden will continue to fall on Ukraine itself, which “must become a steel porcupine, indigestible for potential invaders”. Strengthening Ukraine with arms, trade benefits and financial support is by far the most useful contribution the Europeans can make.
With Putin showing no sign of ending the war or engaging in serious peace negotiations, and Trump reluctant to exert any real pressure on Russia, the Europeans’ ability to secure any ceasefire seems unlikely to be put to the test.
That’s just as well, since we are still far from having a credible political and military capability to deter Russia without dependable US support.
Paul Taylor is a senior visiting fellow at the European Policy Centre