Max Schachter wanted to be close to his son Alex on his birthday, July 9, so he watched old videos of him.
“It put a smile on my face to see him so happy,” Schachter said.
Alex would have turned 21 that day, six years after he and 16 other children and staff at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, were shot and killed by a former student in 2018. In the years before the shooting, that former student had displayed concerning behavior that elicited dozens of calls to 911 and at least two tips to the FBI.
“Alex should still be here today. It’s not fair,” Schachter said.
After two weeks of grieving Alex’s death, Schachter, propelled by anger and pain, began advocating for school safety. In part, he wanted to ensure his three other children would never be harmed in the same way. He joined the newly formed Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission to improve the safety and security of Florida’s students. And he launched a nonprofit bearing Alex’s name, which advocates for school safety.
Doing that work, he learned about threat assessment teams, groups of law enforcement and school officials who try to identify potentially dangerous or distressed kids, intervene, and prevent the next school shooting. Florida is one of about 18 states that require schools to have threat assessment and intervention teams; a national survey estimates 85% of public schools have a team assigned to the task.
The teams, whose mission and operational strategies often are based on research from the FBI and the Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center, or NTAC, have become more common as the number of school shootings has increased. Despite their prevalence for almost 25 years, some of the teams have developed systemic problems that put them at risk of unfairly labeling and vilifying children.
States vary widely in their requirements of threat assessment teams and there isn’t a nationwide archetype. Few school districts and states collect data about the teams, little is known about their operations, and research on their effectiveness at thwarting mass shootings and other threats is limited. But a 2021 analysis by the NTAC of 67 plots against K-12 schools found that people “contemplating violence often exhibit observable behaviors, and when community members report these behaviors, the next tragedy can be averted.”
“School shooters have a long thought process. They don’t just snap. They have concerning behavior over time. If we can identify them early, we can intervene,” said Karie Gibson, chief of the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit.
Yet, Dewey Cornell, a forensic clinical psychologist who in 2001 developed one of the first sets of guidelines for school threat assessment teams, said there have been problems. In many cases, he said, threats have been deemed not serious “but parents and teachers are so alarmed that it is difficult to assuage their fears. The school community gets in an uproar and the school administrators feel pressured to expel the student.”
And in other cases, a school doesn’t do a threat assessment and assumes a student is dangerous when somebody else reports t